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IS RESILIENCE TO CLIMATE CHANGE SOCIALLY INCLUSIVE? INVESTIGATING THEORIES OF CHANGE 





Approaches to resilience to climate change can be socially exclusionary if they do not acknowledge 
diverse experiences of risks or socio-economic barriers to resilience. This paper contributes to 
analyses of resilience by studying how theories of change (ToC) processes used by development 
organizations might lead to social exclusions, and seeking ways to make these more inclusive. 
Adopting insights from participatory monitoring and evaluation, the paper first presents fieldwork 
from four villages in Myanmar to compare local experiences of risk and resilience with the ToCs 
underlying pathways to resilience based on building anticipatory, absorptive, and adaptive 
capacities. The paper then uses interviews with the development organizations using these 
pathways to identify how ToC processes might exclude local experiences and causes of risk, and to 
seek ways to make processes more inclusive. The research finds that development organizations can 
contribute to shared ToCs for resilience, but adopt tacitly different models of risk that reduce 
attention to more transformative socio-economic pathways to resilience. Consequently, there is a 
need to consider how resilience and ToCs can become insufficiently scrutinized boundary objects 











Resilience is now widely discussed within international development as the ability to withstand risks, 
including those arising from anthropogenic climate change (UNDP, 2014; USAID, 2013). Approaches 
to resilience, however, are controversial because they reflect, or even legitimize, wider social values 
and structures (Barrett & Constas, 2014; Brown, 2016; Couzin-Frankel, 2018). Moreover, pathways 
to resilience might exclude local experiences or causes of risk if they are unaware of their own 
assumptions, or are not sensitive to diverse stakeholders (Bahadur & Tanner, 2014; Béné et al., 
2017). 
 
This paper contributes to the analysis of resilience within environment and development policy by 
studying the processes used by development organizations to develop, apply, and adapt theories of 
change (ToCs) for resilience. By so doing, the paper adopts insights from participatory monitoring 
and evaluation (M&E) to investigate the processes by which development organizations adopt and 
revise approaches to resilience. Moreover, it contributes to the analysis of ToCs as sites of 
contestable assumed cause-and-effect and as insufficiently scrutinized boundary objects (Roe, 1991; 
Star & Griesemer, 1989). Indeed, Brown (2016, p. 71) has argued that the role of resilience as a 
boundary object within environmental policy needs further research. 
 
The paper presents a combination of fieldwork and interviews relating to development interventions 
to build resilience in four villages in Myanmar. In particular, it focuses on the frameworks used by 
the development initiative known as BRACED (Building Resilience and Adaptation to Climate 
Extremes and Disasters)i, funded by the United Kingdom Department for International Development 
(DfID). BRACED is a useful example because it actively seeks to build social capacities to address 
climate resilience, rather than other initiatives that focus on strengthening infrastructure or 
managing ecosystems alone. Moreover, BRACED offers the opportunity to analyze diverse ToC 
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processes, based upon program-wide objectives, different pathways to resilience, and the distinctive 
specialisms of its constituent members. 
 
The research had three objectives. First, to analyze the social inclusiveness of different pathways to 
resilience by comparing local experiences of risk and resilience in villages with the ToCs underlying 
each pathway (in particular the research focused on building anticipatory, absorptive, and adaptive 
capacities as the pathways to resilience). Second, to identify the ToC processes, including tacit 
models of risk and socio-economic transformation, used by development organizations to 
understand how different pathways were adopted, applied, revised, or left unchallenged. And third, 
to draw constructive lessons from these studies for making ToC processes and pathways to 
resilience more socially inclusive. 
 
2. MAKING RESILIENCE INCLUSIVE 
 
(a) Resilience as a contested outcome and boundary object 
 
Resilience is commonly defined as the ability to withstand shocks and risks (Adger, 2000; Brown, 
2016). Early definitions of resilience referred largely to physical properties of infrastructure or 
ecosystems, and especially the stability of physical systems during shocks (Holling, 1973, p. 14; 
Ludwig et al., 1997).ii An increasing number of analysts, however, argue that resilience does not only 
refer to physical properties of infrastructure or ecosystems, but also to socio-economic factors such 
as people’s ability to access diverse livelihoods, or avoid long-term drivers of social vulnerability 
(Agrawala & Van Aalst, 2005; Burton et al., 2007; Folke, 2006; Folke et al., 2010; Nelson et al., 2007). 
Accordingly, some observers have argued that resilience, and associated concepts such as adaptive 
capacity, have to be seen in terms of wider social processes of transformational change, which 
locate concepts of resilience within broader socio-economic change and social values concerning 
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development objectives and appropriate levels of risk (Arora-Jonsson, 2016; Brown, 2016; K. 
O'Brien, 2009, 2012; O’Brien et al., 2012; Pelling, 2011; Pelling et al., 2015). 
 
This social basis of resilience raises a number of conceptual concerns. First, as a socially valued 
outcome, there is no single pathway to resilience, and approaches depend on local, or deliberatively 
identified values and circumstances (Levine, 2014; O'Brien & Wolf, 2010; Smith & Stirling, 2010). 
Indeed, Béné et al (2015, p. 7) have drawn from capabilities approaches to development to argue 
that resilience is effectively a theory of change for achieving wellbeing. It is also possible to adapt 
previous questions used to define so-called adaptation science (after Smit et al., 1999): “what” is the 
objective of resilience? (i.e. which risks); “who” is it for? (or what are the socio-economic barriers); 
and “how” (how do different options achieve resilience).iii 
 
Second, frameworks of resilience also imply a tacit model of agency and responsibility for addressing 
risks. Some critics have used this concern to argue that “resilience,” by definition, can fail to 
interrogate, and even tacitly uphold existing social and economic orders, including neo-liberal world 
orders (Adger, 2008; Brown, 2016, p. 63; Chandler & Reid, 2016; Rigg & Oven, 2015; Watts, 2015). 
These worries have also been voiced for other fields of climate policy. Concerning vulnerability 
assessments, Tschakert et al (2013, p. 343) wrote “attention to structural and relational drivers of 
vulnerability has all but disappeared.” Meanwhile, other critics have argued that attempts to build 
resilience through local initiatives such as community-based adaptation to climate change overstate 
the homogeneity and agency of communities, and downplay the role and responsibilities of the state 
and market actors (Dodman & Mitlin, 2013; Forsyth, 2013; Reid & Huq, 2014). These concerns do 
not dismiss the potential for community involvement in transformational change, but instead imply 
a need to consider a range of potential pathways to resilience (Ensor et al., 2016; Quandt, 2018). 
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And thirdly, there are concerns that approaches to resilience can be socially exclusionary if they 
avoid diverse experiences of risk, or barriers to resilience arising from social and economic 
structures (Agrawala & Van Aalst, 2005; Burton et al., 2007; Folke, 2006; Folke et al., 2010; Nelson et 
al., 2007). In particular, approaches to resilience can be exclusionary if they assume that specific 
pathways are universally beneficial, or if they assume that climatic risks are experienced universally 
by all stakeholders. Consequently, a more socially inclusive approach to resilience will not equate 
pathways to resilience with the universal achievement of resilience. But it is also conceptually and 
methodologically challenging to represent resilience in socially sensitive terms. Indeed, “it is much 
easier to measure ‘objective’ events such as rainfall than it is to ‘measure’ the circumstances which 
deprive some people of access to irrigation” (Levine, 2014, p. 15; see also: Boyd et al., 2008; Burton, 
2009; Lemos & Boyd, 2010; Nightingale, 2017; Ribot, 2010). 
 
Some of these concerns might also be expressed through the debate about resilience as a boundary 
object. Boundary objects are commonly defined as ideas, tools, or frameworks that are shared by 
different communities, but which might also be interpreted differently by these groups (Star & 
Griesemer, 1989). Various scholars in environmental science have argued that resilience is a 
boundary object because it seeks to integrate social and natural dimensions of sustainability; or 
because it acts as a communication tool between science and policy (Brand & Jax, 2007; Brown, 
2016, p. 3; Olsson et al., 2015). These interpretations of boundary objects emphasize how they offer 
particular challenges for analysis when they involve different communities of scientists and 
policymakers, and where scientific analysis of risk and vulnerabilities can be mixed with value-driven 
policy work (see also Clark et al., 2016). 
 
The concept of boundary objects, however, can also explain social exclusions and blindspots within 
approaches to resilience. Scholars working in more sociological disciplines have argued that 
boundary objects should not be defined by what is cognitively agreed about their content, but by 
 6 
what is left unquestioned and undiscussed about them (Baggio et al., 2015; Huvila et al., 2014). For 
example, Brand & Jax (2007) argued the “vagueness and malleability” of different interpretations of 
resilience allow different actors to work together on this theme “without a consensus about their 
aims and interests.” Accordingly, they also state that boundary objects are a “hindrance to scientific 
progress” because they serve a purpose in reducing critical scrutiny. In this sense, boundary objects 
might be similar to so-called development narratives and storylines, which refer to commonly-heard 
assumptions about cause-and-effect in development practice, but which oversimplify complex 
relationships, and persist despite the existence of contradictory evidence (Aldunce et al., 2016; 
Hajer, 1995, p. 65; Roe, 1991).  
 
Making approaches to resilience more socially inclusive, therefore, depends partly on acknowledging 
diverse drivers and experiences of risks, and how different stakeholders experience barriers in 
responding to risks. But it also depends on understanding how analytical approaches to resilience 
might receive, or be insulated from, critical scrutiny when they act as shared frameworks between 
different actors. 
 
(b) Theories of Change processes and approaches to resilience   
 
The processes of developing and implementing theories of change (ToCs) are a useful way to analyze 
how approaches to resilience become stabilized or open to criticism. ToCs are the justifications used 
by development organizations to connect their activities with intended outcomes. They are “a 
theory of how and why an initiative works” (Weiss, 1995, p. 65), or “an explanatory model that links 
actions with results via causal mechanisms and pathways” (Brooks & Fisher, 2014, p. 16). 
 
Over time, however, debates about ToCs have acknowledged that development interventions rarely 
use one ToC or causal pathway, but instead rely upon several ToCs that might refer to objectives at 
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different time scales, different collaborating organizations, or different beneficiaries (Funnell & 
Rogers, 2011; Rogers, 2014, p. 12; Stein & Valters, 2012; Valters, 2014, 2015). Simultaneously, the 
discussion about ToCs has been increasingly influenced by insights from participatory monitoring 
and evaluation (M&E), which focuses on revising ToCs by seeking inputs from local stakeholders, and 
by analyzing learning practices within development organizations (Chambers, 2007; Holland, 2013; 
Sullivan & Stewart, 2006; Vogel, 2012). Proponents have argued that participatory M&E is part of a 
broader trend to use M&E for social learning about development interventions rather than for a 
narrow form of accountability to measure the delivery of outputs or logframes (Eyben et al., 2015). 
 
Accordingly, debates about ToCs have generally shifted from identifying specific causal pathways for 
change towards being “an ongoing process of reflection to explore change and how it happens” 
(James, 2011, p. 1). This shift, however, has been called “an illusory process” (Valters, 2014, p. 18) 
because of a variety of challenges. For example, critics have questioned whether the usual insistence 
on stakeholder engagement actually involves targeted beneficiaries (Stein & Valters, 2012, p. 14). A 
further tension is between donor-driven objectives and internally driven ToCs, which might also 
reduce critical attention to how change occurs (Weiss, 1995, p.87). These factors have encouraged 
some analysts to ask whether the processes of discussion and learning under ToC processes should 
be seen as a “rigid plan or vague vision” depending on the need to achieve specific objectives or 
engage in open discussion (Wigboldus & Brouwers, 2011). These criticisms do not dismiss the need 
for ToC processes: they question how far ToC processes actually result in genuine consultation, or 
progress towards causal pathways (Rogers, 2008). 
 
These debates have relevance for ToCs underlying pathways to building resilience to climatic risks. In 
principle, participatory approaches to monitoring and evaluation (M&E) offer a framework for 
answering the questions mentioned above: “what” is the objective of resilience?; “who” is it for?; 
and “how”? (adapted from Smit et al, 1999). In particular, these approaches seek to identify how far 
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existing ToCs deliver socially valued outcomes as opposed to delivering outputs or activities that 
have been defined in the past as pathways to resilient outcomes (Faulkner et al., 2015; Gidley et al., 
2009; McEvoy et al., 2013). 
 
These insights, however, have been applied differentially in assessments of climate change policy. 
For example, some assessments of adaptive capacity—a concept related to resilience—have sought 
to measure success at the local level by developing appropriate national indicators that can be 
compared between regions (Dinshaw et al., 2014; Leiter, 2015; Price-Kelly et al., 2015; Ssekamatte, 
2018). These assessments provide useful measurements of progress towards implementing policy, 
but they also leave ToCs unchallenged. Alternatively, participatory M&E approaches seek to consult 
with beneficiaries of interventions to improve and diversify ToCs (Adler et al., 2015). This kind of 
critique has often been applied to climate resilience based on infrastructure alone. For example, 
research in Nepal argued that stronger bridges installed by the World Bank Pilot Program for Climate 
Resilienceiv focused on maintaining trade during floods, but failed to address local concerns about 
access to other livelihoods or medical care (Ayers et al., 2011). Analysts therefore argue that 
attempts to enhance resilience through infrastructure outputs (such as stronger roads and bridges) 
should also connect with locally valued outcomes (such as wellbeing and continued access to 
services), and therefore adjust their ToCs to include the social barriers to resilience as well (Aldunce 
et al., 2016; Brooks & Fisher, 2014; Faulkner et al., 2015). 
 
Partly as a result of participatory approaches, ToCs for achieving resilience have demonstrated a 
change from analyzing resilience in terms of physical conditions of ecosystems and infrastructure 
towards also including social capacities and processes (Constas et al., 2014; Frankenberger et al., 
2014). These newer approaches carry ToCs that assume that building these capacities in affected 
zones will enhance resilience to risks, including those arising from anthropogenic climate change. 
For example, Béné et al (2015; 2014, p. 599) identified absorptive, adaptive, and transformative 
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capacities as different pathways to resilience. They define absorptive capacity as risk management 
strategies to reduce impacts on livelihoods and basic needs; adaptive capacity as learning and 
adjustments to external and internal drivers of change; and transformative capacity as the “enabling 
environment through investment in good governance, infrastructure, formal and informal social 
protection mechanisms, basic service delivery, and policies/regulations that constitute the necessary 
conditions for systemic change” (Béné et al., 2015, p. 8) (also based on Berkes et al., 2003). These 
authors argue that a crucial aspect of transformational change is the ability to challenge current 
socio-economic conditions that have led to combined ecological, economic and social stresses. 
Indeed, these comments repeat many concerns expressed in debates about so-called 
transformational change mentioned above (e.g. O’Brien et al., 2012; Pelling, 2011; Pelling et al., 
2015), although Brown (2016, p. 174; 2013) also argues that there is no clearly agreed definition of 
transformation (Béné et al., 2014, p. 610; Walker et al., 2006). 
 
These debates about socio-economic transformation, however, have not always been adopted by 
development interventions. For example, the development initiative called BRACED and DfID have 
defined resilience as the “ability to anticipate, avoid, plan for, cope with, recover from and adapt to 
(climate related) shocks and stresses” (DFID, 2014, p. 1), and have identified a complementary set of 
capacities for resilience called the  “3As,” or the capacity to anticipate, absorb, and adapt to shocks 
and stresses (Bahadur et al., 2015; Villanueva & Gould, 2016). Anticipatory capacity refers to early-
warning systems, education, and information. “Transformation” is not mentioned explicitly in these 
capacities, although the relationship between adaptation and transformation is close (Adger et al., 
2007; Pelling, 2011; Schipper, 2006). Yet, it is clear that all of these different capacities are based on 
tacit beliefs about how they will transform social vulnerability or behavior in order to build 
resilience. Making these tacit understandings of socio-economic transformation more transparent 
will allow pathways to resilience to become more inclusive. 
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The concept of boundary objects can assist again with this objective by showing how different 
understandings of transformation can remain hidden within capacity-based approaches to 
resilience. Indeed, some analysts have already blurred the lines between so-called adaptive 
resilience and transformative resilience (Bahadur & Tanner, 2014; Brown, 2016, p. 174; Wilson et al., 
2013). Moreover, Béné et al (2014, p. 609) also argue either term could also be a proxy indicator of 
social vulnerability. The possibility for these terms to mean different things is therefore high. These 
terms might therefore carry social exclusions if they are intended to be used to address problems 
experienced by local people, but adopt pathways or ToCs that were developed for different 
problems and stakeholders. It is therefore useful to analyze ToC processes in order to identify 
whether different interventions carry unquestioned models of risk or social transformation; and 
whether these approaches address local concerns. 
 
The paper now presents research on different capacities as pathways to resilience in Myanmar as a 




3. BUILDING RESILIENCE IN MYANMAR 
 
(a) The national context 
 
Myanmar is appropriate for analyzing the social inclusiveness of resilience interventions because it 
has developing rapidly under various climatic and social challenges. In terms of physical hazards, the 
country has different climatic zones that experience drought and floods, as well as landslides in 
mountainous zones (Relief and Resettlement Department, 2015). The so-called Delta Zone of the 
southwest coastline is exposed to annual flooding, as well as extreme storms such as Cyclone Nargis, 
 11 
which killed more than 84,000 peoplev in 2008. Further inland, the so-called Dry Zone experiences 
regular drought. 
 
In terms of social challenges, Myanmar has also experienced long-term poverty and social inequality 
arising from decades of military dictatorships and armed conflict in some zones. It is now undergoing 
rapid political and economic change, including general elections in 2015. In 2016, Myanmar’s Human 
Development Index was ranked 145 out of 188 countries, with a score of 0.556 compared with 0.720 
for East Asia Pacific.vi Participation of civil society in politics is still limited, and the country is marked 
by strong inequalities in land tenure rights, and uneven economic development, frequently leading 
to local migration in search of employment.vii 
 
Interventions to address climatic risks therefore adopt a variety of approaches. Myanmar’s National 
Adaptation Plan of Action (NAPA) (NECC, 2012) highlighted the diversity of risks, and the country’s 
high dependency on local agricultural production. It also recommended improving early warning 
systems for floods and droughts, as well as other actions such as diversifying agricultural crops and 
introducing climate-resilient varieties (NECC, 2012, p.9). The Myanmar Climate Change Strategy & 
Action Plan (MCCSAP) for 2017-2030 identifies a roadmap for climate resilient development, based 
on developing low-carbon transport, fisheries and climate-smart agriculture.viii The World Bank Flood 
and Landslide Emergency Recovery Project (FLERP) has also intervened to build climate-resilient 
infrastructure such as roads.ix The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) has also 
undertaken work to increase gender-sensitive information concerning climate-related hazards and 
risk management.x These initiatives conduct important work by building capacity and strengthening 
infrastructure, largely by working with national and local government actors. 
 
(b) The BRACED initiative 
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The initiative known as BRACED (Building Resilience and Adaptation to Climate Extremes and 
Disasters) is a useful example of an approach to resilience that targets social capacities rather than 
infrastructure or ecosystems alone. It is therefore an appropriate example to study ToCs processes 
and social inclusiveness relating to resilience. This paper, however, should not be interpreted as a 
criticism or a formal evaluation of BRACED. 
 
BRACED in total currently comprises 15 projects across the African Sahel and South and Southeast 
Asia (BRACED, 2015).xi BRACED in Myanmar involves a collaboration of organizations with different 
specialist skills, including Plan International (the consortium coordinator), ActionAid Myanmar, BBC 
Media Action, the Myanmar Environment Institute (MEI), UN-Habitat, and World Vision. The 
initiative acknowledges the unprecedented institutional, social and economic change in Myanmar.xii 
At the time of research, the network was engaged in a three-year program to “implement a robust 
model of community resilience” in 158 villages across Myanmar, especially focusing on women and 
children.xiii 
 
BRACED-Myanmar has a consortium-wide ToC (see Figure 1), but it also comprises a range of diverse 
and inter-connected ToCs and ToC processes. The consortium-wide ToC distinguishes stakeholders, 
outputs, and outcomes. Stakeholders are communities, local and national government, and civil 
society organizations. Outputs include improved support, knowledge, capacity, and policies to 
address resilience. Outcomes comprise improved wellbeing and enhanced resilience. Progress 
towards resilience can be indicated by the “3As” discussed above of anticipatory, absorptive, and 
adaptive capacities, which also are justified on individual ToCs relating to each capacity (Bahadur et 
al., 2015).  
 
[FIGURE 1 AROUND HERE] 
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Moreover, each organization in the consortium has its own ToC: for example, ActionAid defines its 
approach as a rights-based and empowerment organization;xiv BBC Media Action specializes on 
communication;xv whereas UN-Habitat had invested in access to drinking water.xvi The funding 
organization, DfID, also implemented its own ToC to gain collaboration, mutual learning, and value 
for money within consortiums.xvii  
 
BRACED also engages in ToC processes as sites of learning and interaction.xviii It adopts a 
participatory approach to M&E, noting: “genuinely understanding resilience in practice means 
moving away from a logframe driven and ‘accountability’ M&E culture” (Villanueva & Gould, 2016, 
p. 4). 
 
The objective of the research was to consider the social inclusiveness of the three pathways to 
resilience represented by anticipatory, absorptive, and adaptive capacities, and to learn lessons for 








The study had three objectives: 
 To analyze the social inclusiveness of different pathways to resilience by comparing local 
experiences of risk and resilience in four villages in Myanmar with the theories of change 
(ToCs) underlying the building of anticipatory, absorptive, and adaptive capacities. 
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 To identify the ToC processes, including tacit models of risk and socio-economic 
transformation, used by development organizations to understand how different pathways 
were adopted, applied, revised, or left unchallenged. 
 To draw constructive lessons from these studies for making ToC processes and pathways to 
resilience more socially inclusive. 
 
The three pathways of anticipatory, absorptive, and adaptive capacities were selected in order to 
coincide with the BRACED initiative. These capacities, however, are intended to refer to debates 
about resilience beyond BRACED. In particular, the three capacities can be taken to infer actions 
over three time periods: before specified risks (pre-emptive action, or anticipation); during risks 
(coping, or absorption); and planning for the future (long-term adaptation or transformation). The 
aim, therefore, was not to evaluate BRACED as a single initiative, but to use the study about BRACED 
as a way to draw general lessons about the social inclusiveness of pathways to resilience. 
 
(b) Selection of sites 
 
Fieldwork was undertaken in four villages, which were selected using three criteria. First, villages 
were selected to reflect a range of physical environmental threats and socio-economic inequality. 
Two villages each were selected in the Delta Zone (exposed to river flooding and cyclones) and the 
Dry Zone (exposed to drought). Second, the villages were already included within the BRACED-
Myanmar initiative. Third, villages were identified as typical of local socio-economic and physical 
conditions, and as comparable to each other in terms of size, history, ethnic homogeneity, and 
distance to market towns. 
 
Entry to villages in Myanmar is frequently controlled by rules imposed by local police: foreign 
researchers are not allowed to stay overnight, and access is commonly allowed only through local 
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development organizations. The selection and access to villages was therefore assisted by ActionAid 
Myanmar, which is a member of BRACED-Myanmar, with a specialism on livelihoods and poverty.xix 
ActionAid provided lists of villages in both zones in order to aid selection, and then provided 
translation and transport. ActionAid played no role in shaping the research questions or findings. 
 
The villages selected had already received various development interventions from government or 
foreign assistance. For example, ActionAid had selected and trained young men and women in each 
village to become local coordinators of self-help groups; UN-Habitat had also built drinking water 
wells in the Dry Zone. The villages were also included in the 158 settlements involved in BRACED 
Myanmar. However, it should be noted that the study was not in itself an evaluation of BRACED. 
 
Table 1 shows the location and characteristics of the villages selected. The two villages in the Delta 
zone were near the city of Pathein, about 50km from the coast, and some 200km from the capital 
city of Yangon. This region is characterized by low-lying land crisscrossed by river channels, with 
interspersed zones of irrigated rice fields and forest cover. Annual rainfall is approximately 
2,800mm,xx and the region was on the edge of the zone most affected by Cyclone Nargis in 2008. 
The main local river is the Pathein River, which frequently breaks its banks during the summer rains, 
and is predicted to flood more frequently (NECC, 2012; Relief and Resettlement Department, 2015). 
The ethnicity of the selected villages in the Delta region is Karen (with Christian religion). Villages are 
typically elongated along river channels and beside irrigated rice fields. 
 
The two villages in the Dry zone were near the city of Meiktila in central Myanmar. This zone is some 
600 km to the north of the Delta zone, and is ethnically Burmese (with Buddhist faith). This zone is 
some 400-500km from the coast, and some 200km from the important trading city of Mandalay. 
Annual rainfall here is 824mm,xxi and a drought has been described here since 2010 (Khaing et al., 
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2016). Villages are characterized by narrow streets of wooden houses, sometimes on stilts, 
connected by mud roads.  
 





Empirical work was conducted over a period of five weeks in 2015, with additional research in 2016 
and 2017. Information in villages was collected in three stages. First, a collaborative public meeting 
was arranged by local assistants of ActionAid that invited villagers to discuss environmental risks and 
vulnerability. These meetings attracted between 40 and 90 people in each village, and provided 
initial information about concerns, social divisions, and relevant social groups. These meetings 
typically took about 90 minutes, and allowed the researcher to identify some key informants, as well 
as social groups in each village that could be targeted by further interviews.  
 
Second, the insights from the group meeting were investigated further by holding smaller meetings 
with single or several key informants who represented different groups in each village. Typically, 
there were land owners, landless laborers, members of a specialist village organization such as the 
Women’s Self-Help Group, or individuals who had undertaken new initiatives, and were people who 
represented important social groups in the village, or who had been identified by the earlier group 
discussion as having particular agency in experiencing or responding to risks related to climate. 
These smaller discussions were usually with between 6 and 10 people in groups, or between 3 and 6 
individual interviews per village. The discussions with women groups were the only occasions where 
informants were single gender: the researcher used a female translator in the Delta Zone, and a 
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male translator in the Dry zone, but on both occasions these meetings also involved a female 
coordinator from the village who had been trained by ActionAid.  
 
Thirdly, individual households were then interviewed in order to represent specific categories of 
villager that earlier informants had described as especially vulnerable or challenged. In these cases, 
both men and women household heads were interviewed, together or singly, depending on who 
was available to speak. These household surveys numbered between 10 and 25 per village. 
Interviewees were organized on a semi-structured basis, and were designed to generate comparable 
information between different villages, as well as opportunities for individual people to describe 
particular circumstances. People were asked to define environmental risks in an open-ended way by 
asking them what problems they experienced with livelihoods, land, and agriculture; and then to 
rank these problems. Questions then asked about potential pathways to addressing these 
challenges, and building longer-term resilience. These responses led to quantitative information 
(summarized in Table 3), as well as qualitative impressions and opinions. 
 
The research took special care not to place informants at risk by appearing to discuss politics or to 
criticize authorities. Informants and household surveys were kept anonymous. Nonetheless, some 
informants were keen to highlight some criticisms, such as the actions of the army in annexing some 
village land. All work with villagers was conducted in Burmese language with a translator. 
 
The empirical work with development organizations was conducted via interviews and group 
discussions in English in field offices near the research sites, and in head offices in the capital city of 
Yangon. The research particularly relied on interviews with ActionAid Myanmar, BBC Media Action, 
and Plan International. In addition, two day workshops in Pathein and Yangon, and an international 
conference on Community Based Adaptation to Climate Changexxii also offered opportunities for 
further interviews with other organizations engaged in building resilience in Myanmar. The 
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objectives of these interviews were to identify the processes by which organizations developed and 
then revised ToCs. 
 
Table 2 shows the interviews and household surveys undertake in each village. Table 3 summarizes 
economic activities and landholdings of villages. Table 4 summarizes the study findings about 
different pathways to resilience, and how each of the “3As” capacities contain different tacit models 
of risk and socio-economic transformation. 
 
[TABLE 2 AROUND HERE] 
 
[TABLE 3 AROUND HERE] 
 
[TABLE 4 AROUND HERE] 
 
 
5. FINDINGS: DIFFERENT PATHWAYS TO RESILIENCE 
 
(a) Anticipatory capacity 
 
Anticipatory capacity is defined as the ability of social systems to anticipate and reduce impacts of 
climatic events through preparedness and planning (Bahadur et al., 2015, p. 23). In BRACED 
Myanmar, various development organizations contribute to knowledge and group discussions of 
risks within villages. In particular, BBC Media Action specializes in disseminating information through 
television, websites and other media as a means of building awareness. It has won praise in 
Bangladesh for its reality television program, Amrai Pari (Together we can do it), which builds 
awareness of risks and responses at the community level.xxiii This television work is so far not 
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developed in Myanmar, however. The theory of change (ToC) underlying anticipatory capacity, 
therefore, is that pre-emptive knowledge and action will contribute to resilience against these risks. 
Who might, or might not, benefit from this assumption? 
 
Evidence from the study demonstrated that pre-emptive information about especially hazardous 
risks was discussed during group meetings, and by some informants. These comments, however, 
mainly referred to the extreme events such as dangerous cyclones, rather than pre-existing risks 
such as annual river flooding or drought, even if these might become more serious. 
 
In the Delta zone, the highest ranked hazard was annual river flooding.xxiv Flooding made cropland 
close to the rivers unusable for between 6-10 weeks a year in both villages. It also flooded some low-
lying houses. In both villages, some 30-40 households (or 40-50%) were affected by lost cropland or 
damaged housing per year. Villagers also mentioned other hazards—occasional damage from large 
storms, and damage to crops from wild elephants. The storm events, however, were ranked as less 
significant than annual flooding 
 
Advance knowledge of climatic events, moreover, might benefit landowners more than waged 
laborers. Table 3 shows that the Delta zone villages were characterized by strong inequalities in land 
ownership. The average proportion of landowners in across the two villages was just 35.5%—and 
indeed as low as 21% in one village (Taung Ke Lay).xxv In effect, this distribution meant that the 
majority of people living in the villages worked as laborers on the land owned by a minority. This 
situation implied that flooding posed different risks to landowners and laborers (see Table 4). For 
landowners, the main risk was losing crops, and especially large-scale production such as irrigated 
rice and sugar beet. These crops usually reached maturity simultaneously as the rainy season in the 
summer. For laborers, the main risk was to lose opportunities for labor. Villagers explained that the 
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onset of flooding usually led to periods of some days when landowners would hire labor to collect 
crops, but after harvesting there was little availability for paid work until the floods dissipated.  
 
In the Dry zone, villagers clearly identified drought as the key climatic risk. Indeed, different 
observers commented that significant rain had fallen since 2013. Anticipatory knowledge about 
drought was therefore likely to be less useful than concerning floods, as drought is a slow-onset 
process. But the evidence from the problem-ranking exercise also described two unexpected 
problems not related to climate. In 2008, about half the agricultural land available to one village (Yae 
Ngan) had been appropriated by the Burmese army for an artillery range. The second problem was 
that Myanmar’s rapid economic growth in road construction had created a new trend of people 
digging up boulders from agricultural land in order to sell to roadworks to be broken down into 
gravel. Villagers explained that agricultural land that had been left uncultivated was treated as open 
access by unscrupulous traders. The lack of rainfall exacerbated this situation because it meant that 
cropland had decreased in recent years. Removing boulders also removed topsoil and exposed 
underlying rocks, rendering the land less useful for agriculture. A similar problem occurred in using 
trees on uncultivated land for firewood. 
 
Evidence therefore indicated that anticipatory capacity is most useful as a pathway to resilience 
when climatic events are rare, unexpected, and affect the entire village such as extreme floods or 
cyclones. Such events might occur in the Delta zone more frequently in the future, (NECC, 2012). 
Yet, when events are less rare, anticipatory knowledge alone does not address the most highly-
ranked problems that affect people’s livelihoods. It does not address the challenges of laborers who 
might lose income following a flood; indeed it helps the larger landowners keep the value of their 
crops. In the Dry zone, anticipatory knowledge had only limited benefit to because the drought had 
been experienced for a long time.  
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(b) Absorptive capacity 
 
Absorptive capacity is defined as the ability of social systems to absorb and cope with the impacts of 
climate variability and extremes (Bahadur et al., 2015, p. 30). According to systems analysis, it can 
also be called functional persistence, or the ability of a system to endure impacts of climate 
extremes in the short term (Folke et al., 2010). The underlying ToC, therefore, is that absorptive 
capacity can enhance resilience to climatic risks by allowing people greater ability to withstand these 
events in the short term. 
 
As described above, in the Delta zone the most highly-ranked risk connected to floods was the loss 
of income for laborers. To absorb this impact, many laborers took out loans to cover short-term 
shortages in finance, but interest rates were expensive at typically 10% per month. Lenders were 
often the landowners in village, or from other villages. Few individuals wished to discuss their 
experiences with loans, but in group discussions villagers suggested that about half of both villages 
would have loans at any one time. The most frequent items bought with loans would be to service 
other existing debts, or to cover the purchase of livestock such as goats or carts. Another coping 
action was to seek alternative labor. According to household surveys, typical daily wages in the Delta 
zone varied between $2-2.50 a day for women, and $3 for men. This work tended to be agricultural 
work in zones unaffected by floods. Both villages relied on laborers living locally: there was no 
evidence of inward migration in recent years. 
 
All landowners interviewed in the Delta zone were engaged in various other activities as well as 
agriculture. Floods therefore did not challenge livelihood options as much as waged laborers. 
 
Villages, however, had adopted various forms of communal help. Self Help Groups for women had 
been established in 2014 (with the assistance of ActionAid), and Village Disaster Management 
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Committees had been established in 2015. The objectives of these committees were to offer 
cheaper loans and assistance for members, and to communicate about floods and offer potential 
assistance afterwards. Typical loan rates from these groups were 2% per month, in comparison to 
the 10% usually charged by landowners. Both villages also employed communal institutions to 
alleviate risks. For example, both villages had rice banks, where villagers were allowed to remove 
100lb (45.4kg) of rice on condition they returned 150lb (68kg) after three months. This rice could be 
grown on personal land, purchased in markets, or borrowed from personal contacts. 
 
A main limitation on absorptive capacity, however, was the need to gain access to drinking water 
before and after floods. Collecting water was a constraint on time available for livelihoods—there 
was no piped water in either village. The household surveys showed that collecting water from wells 
was undertaken in more than 80% of cases by women or children. It also took an average of 30 
minutes per trip to retrieve water from wells for both villages, with an average of two to four trips 
per day. Carts were available for collecting for collecting water but were owned by landowners, who 
also charged 100 Kyat (c $0.1) for each trip. Simultaneously, individuals could also be paid $0.1 per 
trip for collecting water for households. 
 
In the Dry zone, the most common response to drought in the short-term was to rely less on 
agriculture, and to seek alternative sources of income. On average, 28% of people in both villages 
had migrated from the village to seek jobs elsewhere (some 260 adults). The two most popular jobs 
undertaken by migrants was quarry work (in various locations in Myanmar), or restaurant work in 
Mandalay. One family noted that restaurant workers there could earn $120 per month after two 
years’ experience.xxvi These incomes were significantly more than the equivalent cash value of 
agricultural work in the two villages studied. Waged labor for men in quarries was also higher than 
local agricultural labor, with a typical daily wage of $4-5. 
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But there were also limitations and inequalities about waged labor. As with the Delta Zone, women 
laborers were paid less than men (see Table 3). Despite the availability of wells (such as those built 
in villages by UN-Habitat), many women and children still collected water from the local watercourse 
between two and four times a day. Local cultural practice meant that it was considered 
inappropriate for women to drive bullock carts. 
 
There were also limitations on gaining alternative employment. Social networks and family 
connections mattered for jobs in different locations. For example, two households described how 
their sons had gained jobs in Mandalay because their cousin and uncle had already worked at a 
restaurant there. Some other young men (estimated to be ten in total) had also joined the local 
army camp. The evidence from interviews, however, indicated that only a few individuals had 
decided to move permanently to Mandalay. 
 
Evidence therefore indicated that absorptive capacity offered various ways of reducing impacts of 
climatic risks as they happened. In particular, the construction of rice banks was widely 
acknowledged to reduce risks of food insecurity for the most vulnerable in Delta zone villages. Other 
forms of absorption, however, were difficult to differentiate from longer-term socio-economic 
transitions that might also be labelled as adaptive capacity (see next section). For example, the most 
common form of absorption in the Dry zone, of seeking alternative employment, was also influenced 
by gendered inequalities in labor markets, and selective access to alternative employment. 
Moreover, the simple coping mechanism of taking our loans is another process that emphasizes the 
difference between laborers (who take our loans) and landowners (who make loans). As discussed in 
Section 6, the benefit of interventions to build absorptive capacity depend in part on the implicit 
models of risk and socio-economic transformation adopted within the ToC. 
 
(c) Adaptive capacity 
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Adaptive capacity is defined as the ability of social systems to learn and adjust after extreme events 
in order to reduce the likelihood of negative impacts in the future (Bahadur et al., 2015, p. 13). As 
noted in Sections 2 and 3, the BRACED initiative uses the term adaptive capacity, although other 
analysts might argued that all of the “3As” refer to different aspects of adaptation in general; and 
that the essence of this last capacity is a focus on future transformations and learning. The ToC 
underlying adaptive capacity, therefore, is that this capacity will be a pathway to resilience because 
it will allow a long-term transformation in social behaviors and exposures that diminish negative 
impacts of climatic risks. 
 
In the Delta zone, all landowners interviewed had diversified agricultural production from the 
standard crops of rice and sugar beet to include small amounts of higher-value crops such as 
tomatoes, beans, or gourds such as cucumbers. Landowners, however, were in a relatively privileged 
position of having more income and opportunities for investing in alternative income sources. No 
landowners had acted to adapt to flooding risks by building physical infrastructure such as levees. 
 
Innovations by laborers, by comparison, were relatively poorly developed. Some laborers had 
diversified into producing high-value vegetables by renting small plots of land from landowners. One 
entrepreneur had borrowed money to rent land to establish a duck farm (this was established in 
2014, and at the time of research was the only duck farm in both villages). As noted above, relatively 
few people migrated from the village to seek other jobs: an average of just 7% of all population 
(some 75 adults) (see Table 1). In most cases, migrants had travelled long distances such as to the 
capital city, Yangon. Just two people were working overseas (in Bangkok and Singapore). Self-help 
groups also assisted with long-term learning about different crops. 
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The limitations on long-term learning and adjustment, however, were related to some of the 
underlying inequalities in the villages. Land ownership was concentrated into a relatively small 
proportion of both villages. In both villages, women had only been allowed to claim land ownership 
in their own name since 2010. The longer-term processes of adaptation, therefore, were 
characterized by two different streams depending on whether households or individuals had access 
to land, or were laborers. Longer-term transformation for non-land owners was also limited by the 
relative lack of mobility and opportunities for people to work in different locations or develop non-
agricultural forms of business. 
 
In the Dry zone, about 25% of households had diversified livelihoods since 2013 by expanding their 
ownership of goats as drought-tolerant livestock. The people investing in goats were typically 
landowners who were affected by declining agricultural yields: in Yae Ngan village, this group also 
included very small landowners who had just one or three acres. The job of looking after goats was 
given to household members, who often looked at neighbors’ goats on a reciprocal (but unpaid) 
basis. A smaller proportion of households surveyed (8%) also used drought-tolerant crops such as 
sesame and cotton, although these crops had been used for years before the recent drought (Table 
3). 
 
A more common response in the Dry zone, however, was pessimism about long-term agriculture in 
the region, and the reality that village land had become less significant for generating household 
income. Approximately 52% of both villages in the Dry Zone had certified claims to land. But under 
the conditions of drought, villagers now sought alternative livelihoods based on migration, 
remittances, and non-agricultural income. In one village (Than Taw) villagers claimed that crops had 
declined by 66% since 2010, and one farmer stated “farming is no longer viable here.” Drought, of 
course, is just one factor among many that might contribute to decline in crops. Various informants, 
however, shared the view that long-term adaptation implied moving away from a reliance on 
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agriculture. Neither village produced staple crops such as rice. Indeed, various informants claimed 
that the overall economy of the villages in the Dry zone was changing from a traditional reliance on 
agriculture towards using land in villages as collateral for loans, and as a node for different family 
members to conduct different livelihoods in different places. For example, villages (and the houses 
where people lived) were now treated generally as homes for the youngest and oldest 
generations—i.e. grandparents looking after grandchildren—while adult parents earned incomes 
elsewhere. 
 
Evidence about adaptive capacity, therefore, largely referred to the broader transitions occurring in 
economies, and the possibility for different social groups (including genders) to gain access to 
livelihoods within these changes. Yet, as with absorptive capacity above, the inclusiveness of 
adaptive capacity partly depends on the definition of the risks or challenges that it is meant to 
address. The social learning that enables individuals in the Delta zone to reduce the negative impacts 
of floods are inherently connected to underlying social structures that distinguish between families 
with or without claims to land, and the access to funds and assets (such as secure housing, 
transportation, and collateral) that comes with that. The main opportunities observed in the Dry 
zone also referred to the sudden growth of attractive economic livelihoods in neighboring cities as 
well as the combined social and physical changes that make farming on contested dry land less 
attractive than before. The adaptation under these conditions is not driven by the physical climatic 
risks such as floods or droughts, but by the ability to gain access to these new opportunities. 
 
The inclusiveness of adaptive capacity as a pathway to resilience, therefore, depends on the way in 
which adaptation is defined vis-à-vis broader transformational change, and the opportunities for 
vulnerable people to participate in these changes. Defining adaptive capacity too narrowly in terms 
of learning to avoid floods and drought as risks, might miss the broader driving forces of what makes 
these physical events hazardous, and consequently pay insufficient attention to what might 
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constitute inclusive pathways to resilience. This point has also been made in relation to the driving 
forces for adaptation to climate change (Christoplos et al., 2009; Forsyth & Evans, 2013; Patnaik & 
Das, 2017; Sabates-Wheeler et al., 2008). 
 
 
6. THEORIES OF CHANGE PROCESSES 
 
This section now discusses the findings above with insights from interviews with development 
organizations. The objectives are to identify the ToC processes that might influence chosen 
pathways to resilience, especially tacit models of risk and socio-economic transformation, and how 
far these can be understood as boundary objects. 
 
(a) Models of risk 
 
The discussion of fieldwork above showed that the “3As” framework adopted useful interventions 
such as awareness-raising, safety nets (such as rice banks), and economic empowerment (self-help 
groups) that reduce negative impacts of floods and droughts. Indeed, these activities are also listed 
as achievements under BRACED’s own M&E assessments, which refers to successful outcomes such 
as enhanced women and children’s participation in decisionmaking, better communication, and 
better all-round resilience through access to food and diverse livelihoods. These achievements are 
summarized in Table 5. 
 
[TABLE 5 AROUND HERE] 
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But at the same time, these assessments of resilience are also based on assumptions about the 
cause-and-effect of risk and resilience that might narrow down the range of risks experienced by 
people, and consequently potential pathways to resilience as well. 
 
First, the fieldwork findings questioned the ability to treat events such as floods and drought as risks 
that affect all people universally. In particular, the evidence showed that floods impacted on land 
owners and laborers differently. Landowners struggled to harvest crops in time, and then faced 
some months with unproductive agricultural land. Landless laborers, on the other hand, faced an 
end to their main source of income. Similarly, the impact of drought varied between households 
according to their ability to access alternative income. The impact of drought was also affected by 
secondary and exogenous factors such as the enclosure of land by the army, or the unscrupulous 
removal of boulders from unused land. A model of risk that assumes universal threats arising from 
floods and droughts therefore avoids socio-economic factors that make these physical changes 
hazardous. 
 
Secondly, this concern can also be applied to the treatment of women and children as universal 
demographic categories. Fieldwork indicated that women experienced various inequalities, such as 
barriers to land ownership, lower wages, or restrictions on transport. Yet, there were also other 
socio-economic influences on women’s agency, such as their status as landless laborers, or single 
household heads. The exposure of individuals to risk is therefore connected to both gender and 
economic status. 
 
And consequently, thirdly, these findings present challenges for how far the “3As”—in their current 
formulation—represent pathways towards resilience because these terms are organized around the 
physical changes associated with climatic risks. They do not, for example, emphasize the economic 
activities impacted on by physical events, nor the underlying social and economic conditions that 
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regulate vulnerability to those events. In particular, the “anticipatory” aspect of the “3As” has the 
potential to save lives by providing early warning and educational material about risks, yet at the 
same time, anticipatory capacity is the most likely capacity to adopt a universalist model of risk that 
avoids the different vulnerabilities of individuals. This tension is perhaps reflected in BRACED’s own 
evaluation, which states that “accessing and using weather and climate information is a critical 
element in building anticipatory, absorptive and adaptive capacities” (Villanueva et al., 2016, p. 
11)—yet also that “addressing and dealing with the socioeconomic and political dimensions of 
resilience-building are equally important” (Villanueva et al., 2016, p. 13). Despite this statement, it is 
still possible that delivering climate information to new users might be taken, de facto, to be the 
delivery of resilience. Indeed, BRACED (2017, p. 3e) noted that 359,000 people across Myanmar 
have been reached by resilience and adaptation messages. This number is chiefly a measurement of 
outputs, based on a ToC that highlights the importance of information, rather than an measurement 
of resilience as an outcome. 
 
(b) Models of transformation 
 
As noted above, the BRACED-Myanmar consortium contained different organizations who shared a 
common ToC for resilience, but with different assumptions about how to enact social change or 
transformation. Table 4 shows these tacit assumptions or models of socio-economic transformation 
as contained in each of the “3As.” The point of this information is to show how each of the three 
capacities (of anticipatory, absorptive, and adaptive) might also contain implicit ideas about socio-
economic transformation even if “transformative capacity” is not identified separately. 
 
Representatives of Plan International and ActionAidxxvii stated they performed interventions to 
increase local agency and decrease socio-economic vulnerability within villages, such as the creation 
of self-help groups, or greater representation of marginalized groups in local decisionmaking. BBC 
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Media Action, on the other hand, emphasized access to climate information as a key means of 
avoiding risk.xxviii This second model still acknowledged social influences: one informant from BBC 
Media Action suggested that dissemination inside households often depended on whoever had the 
TV remote control. This implicit model of vulnerability to climate-risks, however, referred to a deficit 
of knowledge rather than socio-economic structures and inequalities. 
 
The study provided evidence that current approaches to absorption and adaptation inside villages 
occasionally reinforced social inequalities. As noted above, anticipatory capacity tended to benefit 
landowners in the Delta zone more than laborers because it gave the knowledge to protect their 
crops from floods. Yet, following floods, laborers often coped with the loss of livelihoods by taking 
out loans from land owners who charged high rates of interest. Carts for collecting water were also 
available for hire from landowners.  
 
The “3As” framework allowed some interventions to overcome these barriers, such as by allowing 
self-help groups to offer loans at cheaper rates (2% interest per month instead of 10%). Rice banks 
also provided immediate food security for poorer people affected by floods or drought. These 
interventions have an implicit model of transformation based on empowering individuals and 
organizations within the village to take responsibility for these approaches to resilience. They do not 
acknowledge the role of the state or military in controlling land, or influencing markets. Yet, perhaps 
this is unsurprising. Informants in Plan International and ActionAid noted that all non-governmental 
organizations in Myanmar are limited in criticizing the government, or engaging with entrenched 
inequalities. Accordingly, it was easier to work with government agencies by discussing technical 
solutions to climate risks rather than seeking responses to social and economic inequality.xxix This 
important point complements earlier criticisms (e.g. Levine, 2014, p. 15) that blindspots in resilience 
thinking occur because it is “easier to measure ‘objective’ events such as rainfall than it is to 
‘measure’ the circumstances which deprive some people of access to irrigation.” The evidence from 
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this study is that sometimes this is because of the constraints that development organizations work 
under.  
 
(c) Theories of change as boundary objects 
 
Various pieces of evidence therefore suggest that pathways and ToCs of resilience serve as boundary 
objects because of the way they are shared by different actors yet offer different meanings. For 
example, the statement that BRACED (2017, p. 3e) had impacted on 359,000 people in Myanmar 
points to combined activities of different organizations, using diverse pathways. But as noted above, 
these pathways are not universally beneficial, and might even fail to address diverse experiences or 
causes of risks. Resilience becomes a boundary object when it allows different organizations to claim 
their own outputs as equivalent to achieving a shared outcome. 
 
One possible explanation for this situation came from ActionAid’s country director: “the usual trend 
for consortiums is that each organization’s representative carries out its own objectives: there is no 
time or incentive for individuals to adapt that framework for the consortium.”xxx This statement has 
also been made in debates about participatory M&E: Faulkner (2015, p. 92) has argued that 
organizations tend to persist in doing what they do well. She urges “We need to move beyond asking 
‘Are we doing what we said we would do?’ to ‘does it work?,’ which begs the question of ‘Who does 
it work for?’” It is difficult to challenge pathways to resilience if they have historic evidence of being 
useful, or if there is a chance that they might be useful for some users. Persisting with these 
pathways in all cases, however, might result in confusing the delivery of outputs with the 
achievement of resilience as a final outcome. 
 
There are therefore diverse reasons why ToCs might persist as boundary objects: the dynamics of 
individual organizations within coalitions; the possibility that all pathways will be useful eventually; 
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and the constraints of working under authoritarian conditions. If these pathways are based on 
contestable but unchallenged models of risk and transformation, then there is a chance that ToC 
processes will continue to be socially exclusionary. Instead, it is important to ask what experiences 
and causes of risks are left unexplored, and how do existing ToC processes crowd out attention to 
more flexible and locally sensitive alternative ToCs. 
 
 
7.  CONCLUSION: MAKING CLIMATE RESILIENCE MORE INCLUSIVE 
 
This paper has used an empirical study of resilience in Myanmar to identify ways to make theories of 
change (ToCs) and pathways to climate resilience more socially inclusive. Various conclusions can be 
made. 
 
First, the discussion of ToCs within development planning in recent years has changed from a culture 
of delivering outputs and logframes, towards using ToCs as an ongoing framework for learning and 
revising causal pathways (Rogers, 2014; Stein & Valters, 2012). Evidence from this study, however, 
suggests that ToC processes can still leave important assumptions tacit and unquestioned. In 
particular, this study has highlighted implicit models of risk and socio-economic transformation. 
These models underlie discussions about ToCs for pathways to resilience, but these models also can 
fail to acknowledge diverse experiences and causes of risk, including socio-economic barriers to 
resilience (also see Brown, 2016, p. 174). This challenge applies especially to the use of anticipatory 
capacity (or the preparation of vulnerable people through climate knowledge and early warnings) 
because this tends to adopt universalistic approaches to the nature of risk or of vulnerable people. 
Instead, evidence from this study suggests socio-economic drivers of risk and vulnerability tend to be 
overlooked. There is a need to look more critically at ToC processes in order to identify whether 
multiple and inter-connected ToCs in development interventions also include tacit models of risk or 
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social transformation that are not given equal critical scrutiny (Bahadur & Tanner, 2014; Burton, 
2009; Gidley et al., 2009; McEvoy et al., 2013). 
 
Second, there is a continuing need to ensure that development outputs are not conflated with 
development outcomes in the field of resilience. Outputs can be short-term deliverables such as 
climate information that are justified by ToCs. Outcomes, however, are longer-term transitions 
towards development objectives (Funnell & Rogers, 2011; Valters, 2015). This study has suggested 
that concepts, pathways, and ToCs of resilience can all become boundary objects when they are 
adopted by diverse users with different objectives and modes of working. Under these conditions, 
different actors can claim to be achieving resilience when they are delivering different outputs. 
Being aware that resilience, and its pathways and ToCs, might become boundary objects is a first 
step to seeing how approaches to resilience might not always address diverse experiences and 
causes of risks. 
 
The main challenge is that complex processes of development planning and collaboration can lead to 
the persistence of unhelpful assumptions. ToC processes therefore seem to be another field in which 
development narratives, or under-examined assumptions about cause-and-effect can continue 
within development practice (Hajer, 1995; Roe, 1991). Focusing on how ToCs remain unchallenged, 
or insufficiently inclusive, is a key way to make development interventions for resilience more useful 
and effective. In turn, this means asking more questions about ways to integrate resilience planning 
within social norms about how, and for whom, climatic events become hazardous (Pelling, 2011; 
O’Brien, 2012; Smit et al., 1999), and challenging development organizations to ensure that ToCs are 
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Table 2: Interviews and household surveys per village 
 
 Delta Zone Dry Zone 
Village name Taung Ke Lay Pann Taw Gyi Yae Ngan Than Taw 
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No. of group 
discussions 
3 
1 female specific 
3 
1 female specific 
2 
1 female specific 
2 
1 female specific 
 
 
Table 3: Summary of livelihoods and landholdings per village 
 
 Delta Zone Dry Zone 
Village name Taung Ke Lay Pann Taw Gyi Yae Ngan Than Taw 
Population (2015) 420 620 480 437 
Households  78 85 67 64 
Households with 
titled access to 
agricultural land (%) 
21% 50% 58% 47% 
Average agricultural 
land holding (ha) 




6.9 14.6 3.5 3.5 
Main agricultural 
crops 
Rice, sugar beet, 
beans, chilli 
































Average daily wage 
of laborers (women) 
(USD)* 
2 – 2.5 
 
2 – 2.5 
 
2 – 2.5 
(2 for quarry 
work)  
2 – 2.5 
(2 for quarry 
work) 
Average daily wage 
of laborers (men) 
(USD)* 
3 3 3 
(4-5 for quarry 
work) 
3 
(4-5 for quarry 
work)  
Sources: fieldwork 
* Conversion rate: 1000 Kyats = 1 USD 
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Table 4: Observed social exclusions under different resilience pathways (anticipatory, 
absorptive, adaptive capacities) 
 
 
 Anticipatory Absorptive Adaptive 
Typical actions Early warning and 
awareness raising of 
specific hazards 
Coping mechanisms 
during hazard  
Learning to diminish 
impacts of hazard over 
time 





migration, rice banks, 
affordable loans 
Long-term transitions in 
livelihoods, e.g. from 
agriculture to 
remittances, higher-
value crops and drought- 
or flood-resistant 
livestock 
What and who is 
included? 
Warnings of extreme 
events, allows 
landowners to harvest 
crops 
Rice banks offer food 
security, self-help 
groups offer affordable 
loans 
New crops and livestock 
assist villagers wiling to 
diversify (e.g. ducks, 
goats) 
What and who is 
excluded? 
Does not address 
livelihoods of laborers 
Does not achieve 
alternative incomes or 
employment for laborers 
Does not address 
problems of accessing 
new livelihoods in new 
sectors, or political 
controls on land, few 
farmers innovate 
Implicit model of risk 
contained in each 
capacity 
Risk located in lack of 
knowledge of climate 
Risk located in exposure 
to climatic events 
Risk located in barriers 
to learning and 
diversification 
Implicit model of 
transformation 
contained in each 
capacity 
Village authorities, self-
help groups, and media 
can produce resilience  
Village authorities, self-
help groups, and 
development 
organizations can 
enhance services and 
infrastructure 
Villages, self-help 
groups, and individuals 
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